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Problem description 
As analyses have predicted and reality has shown, the integration of large amounts of 
renewable energy sources (RES) in the European power system reduces the profits of 
conventional power plants significantly. However, due to the intermittence of RES, sufficient 
conventional power plants or other flexibility options are required as back-up to ensure 
system adequacy and a reliable operation of the power system. 
The Nordic and especially the Norwegian hydro-based power production is in a favourable 
position to provide at least parts of the required generation back-up capacity for RES 
situated in continental Europe. In order to provide this, sufficient transfer capacity needs to 
be available. However, for the HVDC-cables it is observed that outages occur rather regular 
and could remain for long periods. During such events, back-up capacity could not be 
provided. 
The aim of the master project is to assess the impact of HVDC-cable outages on exchange 
and the value of providing back-up generation capacity to continental Europe. Cable outages 
shall thereby be modelled with the help of EMPS, including the expectation for outages in 
the operation optimization of the power system. 
Sub-tasks: 
 Implement cable outage scenarios in a detailed dataset for Northern Europe 
 Run cable outage scenarios for Northern Europe 
 Assess the value of capacity provision taking into account cable outages 
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Summary 
This master thesis investigates sudden HVDC-cable exchange limitations between thermal-
based and hydro dominated areas from a market perspective. Thermal-based areas are 
based on fossil-fired units in combination with large amounts of wind and solar energy. This 
power production structure resembles Germany.  
The power market simulator used is EMPS (EFIs Multi-area Power-market Simulator), which 
is a well-known simulation tool throughout the Nordic area. The simulation uses historical 
water inflow and weather measurements for 75 climatic years, giving a wide range of 
different outcomes. The outage analyses are mainly done in a data set developed by SINTEF 
resembling the North-European power system configuration in year 2030.  
The EU has agreed upon extensive objectives regarding reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions. The energy sector is changing towards more Renewable Energy Sources (RES). 
The challenge is that RES is not able to accomplish the same flexibility as conventional power 
plants provide. Flexible hydropower production from Norway intends to support 
intermittence of RES and contribute to security of supply. Exchange capacity from Norway to 
continental Europe is provided through HVDC-cables. This report shows the impact of HVDC-
cable outages on North-European power prices.   
Statistical data shows that HVDC-cable disturbance outages occur. Disturbance outages are 
forced outages limiting the cross-border power exchange. The average cable unavailability 
due to such outages is 2.4 weeks per year. The cable investigated is the planned cable 
connecting Norway to Germany, Nord.Link, with a capacity of 1.4 GW. Outages are modelled 
annually from the beginning of the first week in each simulated climatic year. There is a 
higher probability of stressed operation in winter time, due to high load combined with 
lower solar production, and this season is assumed to be a critical period for outages.  
The results show that a three-week outage of Nord.Link has close to no impact on the 
average price in Germany for all 75 simulated years. However, during power capacity 
shortage, the price increases significantly. Power capacity shortage comes with low wind and 
solar production combined with high consumption, and demand is met by use of expensive 
flexible load. It is seen that the highest price in Germany reaches 900 EUR/MWh at worst. 
This is 200 EUR/MWh higher than if Nord.Link had been available.  
German consumers are most affected during outage on Nord.Link. In this study, a three-
week outage reduces the consumer surplus in Germany by 60 MEUR in the worst year due to 
the significant increase in prices. However, the mean loss in consumer surplus for all climatic 
years is less, being close to 8 MEUR. The results also discover that there is not the outage 
length that is critical regarding consequences, but the initial power situation in the affected 
period. A fifteen-week outage of Nord.Link on average costs German consumers 30 MEUR, 
while a two-week outage during power capacity shortage exceeds 50 MEUR.  
The results show that transmission cable outage gives the same consequences in consumer 
surplus in Germany as power production outage for the same capacity. Additionally, the 
fault-statistics are in favour of cables. Cross-border capacity should therefore be included in 
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foreign Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM). CRM pays for installed capacity to 
support intermittence of renewables, making power supply capacity more profitable.  
Furthermore, Norway becomes a more secure source of supply in the future due to more 
interconnections, making it possible to import energy in dry years to store water in 
reservoirs.  
HVDC-cable exchange between the Nordic area and the European continent improves 
security of supply, and is in line with EUs target of a clean and strongly interconnected 
power system. The value of providing back-up capacity to the continent is high because the 
power exchange will reduce continental prices significantly during power capacity shortage, 
reducing the electricity bill for consumers. 
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Sammendrag 
Masteroppgaven analyserer konsekvenser av HVDC-kabel utfall mellom termisk-basert 
kraftsystemområde i Nord Europa og vannkraft-dominert område i Norge fra et 
markedsperspektiv. Det termisk-baserte området er basert på produksjonsenheter som 
benytter fossilt brennstoff i kombinasjon med store mengder vind og sol energi. Denne 
produksjonsstrukturen kjennetegner Tyskland.  
Kraftmarkedssimulatoren som er benyttet er EMPS (Samkjøringsmodellen), som er et 
velkjent simuleringsverktøy i de nordiske landene. Simuleringsverktøyet bruker historiske 
tilsig- og værmålinger for 75 klimatiske år, noe som gir en stor bredde av ulike resultater. 
Utfallsanalysene er hovedsakelig gjort i et datasett utviklet av SINTEF for det nord-
europeiske kraftsystemet i år 2030.  
EU har satt seg omfattende mål i forhold til reduksjon av drivhusgasser. Energisektoren 
endres mot mer fornybare energikilder. Utfordringen er at fornybare energikilder ikke har 
den samme tekniske fleksibiliteten som konvensjonelle kraftverk har. Fleksibel 
vannkraftproduksjon fra Norge kan støtte uregelmessig produksjon av fornybar energi, og 
dermed bidra til økt forsyningssikkerhet. Kraftutveksling mellom Norge og kontinentet skjer 
gjennom HVDC-kabler. Denne rapporten viser hvilke påvirkning HVDC-kabel utfall har på 
nord-europeiske kraftpriser. 
Statistisk data viser at det forekommer driftsforstyrrelser på HVDC-kabler. Driftsforstyrrelser 
er utilsiktede utfall som begrenser utvekslingsmulighetene. Gjennomsnittlig er kabler 
utilgjengelige 2.4 uker per år som følge av driftsforstyrrelser. Den planlagte 1.4 GW kabelen 
mellom Norge og Tyskland, Nord.Link, er basis for analysen. Årlige utfall er modellert fra 
begynnelsen av første uke i hvert simulerte klimatiske år.  Det er en større sannsynlighet for 
produksjonsknapphet på vintertid som følge av høy last kombinert med lavere produksjon 
fra solenergi, og det er derfor antatt at utfall på denne tiden er kritisk.  
Resultatene viser at et tre-ukers utfall av Nord.Link har liten påvirkning på 
gjennomsnittsprisen i Tyskland for alle de 75 simulerte årene. Ved utfall i perioder med 
produksjonsknapphet øker imidlertid prisene betydelig. Produksjonsknapphet kommer som 
følge av lav produksjon av vind- og solenergi kombinert med høy last. I slike tilfeller dekkes 
kraftetterspørselen av kostbar fleksibel last. Resultatene viser at de høyeste prisene i 
Tyskland når 900 EUR/MWh på det verste. Dette er 200 EUR/MWh høyere enn hvis 
Nord.Link hadde vært tilgjengelig.  
Tyske forbrukere er mest berørt som følge av utfall av Nord.Link. Dette studiet viser at et tre-
ukers utfall reduserer konsumentoverskuddet i Tyskland med 60 MEUR i det verste året som 
følge av en betydelig økning i priser. Derimot er det gjennomsnittlige 
konsumentunderskuddet for alle klimatiske år kun 8 MEUR. Resultatene avdekker også at 
det ikke er utfallslengden som er kritisk med tanke på konsekvenser, men 
produksjonsknappheten i den berørte perioden. Et femten-ukers utfall av Nord.Link koster i 
gjennomsnitt tyske forbrukere 30 MEUR, mens et to-ukers utfall under produksjonsknapphet 
kan overstige 50 MEUR.  
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Resultatene viser at transmissionskabelutfall gir tilsvarende konsekvenser som utfall av 
kraftproduksjon med lik kapasitet for konsumentoverskudd i Tyskland. I tillegg er 
feilstatistikken i favør kabler. Derfor bør utvekslingskapasitet på kabler være med i andre 
lands kapasitetsmekanismer. Kapasitetsmekanismer betaler for installert kapasitet for å 
støtte uregelmessig produksjon fra fornybare energikilder. Deltakelse øker lønnsomheten for 
kraftproduksjonsanlegg.  
Resultatene viser også at Norge i fremtiden vil bli en sikrere energikilde som følge av flere 
utlandsforbindelser. Det er fordi Norge kan importere energi i tørre år for på den måten 
spare vann i egne reservoarer. 
Energiutveksling mellom det nordiske området og det europeiske kontinentet forbedrer 
forsyningssikkerheten i tillegg til å tilfredsstille EUs mål om ren energi og et sterkt 
sammenkoplet nett. Verdien av å tilby fleksibel kapasitet til kontinentet er høy fordi 
kraftutvekslingen vil redusere prisene på kontinentet betydelig ved kapasitetsknapphet, noe 
som videre vil redusere elektrisitetsregningen for forbrukerne. 
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1. Introduction 
The EU has agreed upon extensive objectives regarding reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions. Within 2030, the domestic reduction in emission should at least be 40 % 
compared to 1990 levels (European Commission, 2015). A great part of the reduction is 
addressed to the energy sector.  
To reduce greenhouse gas emissions, fossil-fired units are unwanted. The counter part is 
Renewable Energy Sources (RES), which are implemented in vast numbers by help of 
subsidies. The majority of RES is wind and solar energy. However, this change in energy mix 
challenges security of supply of electricity due to the intermittent and unpredictable supply 
of power plant feedstock. The correlation between wind and solar production and demand 
do not necessarily meet. In 2013, almost 40 % of the installed generation capacity in Europe 
was RES power (ENTSO-E, 2014). Installed capacity with great amounts of such sources will 
result in some very high prices in order to obtain balance between production and demand.  
To avoid lack of production, available flexible capacity is preferred before use of load 
shedding. Energy-only market (EOM) as well as current policy challenge this. In EOM, 
producers bid amounts of energy to specific prices. The only payment is for the actual 
production in energy. The merit order effect occurs as RES has close to zero marginal cost 
and are first to be dispatched. Fossil-fired units need to pay for fuel, which RES do not. 
Additionally, CO2-emission is costly and the CO2-price is expected to increase in the future. 
The merit order effect drives prices down, reducing the utilization time of fossil-fired units. 
This makes them less profitable (or even non-profitable). The power system, however, needs 
flexible capacity to support the intermittence of RES.  
A Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM) is a measure to keep capacity within the system 
to ensure that there is enough installed capacity. Participants of CRM are paid for their 
installed capacity on top of any production. This increases their revenue.  
However, capacity does not necessarily only come from domestic production, but can also 
be provided by cross border exchange. Through the Guidance Package, the European 
Commission requires that CRM is to be open for foreign participation for other Member 
States (European Commission). Beside national initiatives, owners of cross-border capacity 
want to be included in CRM in order to increase their revenue. This is the case for NSN, 
connecting Norway to Great Britain. Statnett would like the cable to be a part of Great 
Britain’s capacity auction. This would compensate for their contribution to security of 
supply. This is also in line with the European Commission’s target for the Internal Energy 
Market (IEM), which aim to coordinate and strongly interconnect the European system.  
The purpose of CRM is to ensure system adequacy, so it seems logical that all kind of flexible 
capacity is included. However, there are some major topics up for discussion. There are 
always producers supplying the cable with power. How should cable owners and producers 
coordinate their supply making sure power is available when needed? What happens if there 
is lack of power on both sides? And what kind of penalty is reasonable if the cable is out of 
service?  
2 
 
This report intends to reveal consequences regarding unpredictable outages of cross-border 
capacity between hydro dominated and thermal-based areas with vast amounts of RES from 
a market perspective. Production outage is also evaluated and compared to cable outage. 
This is done in order to see if the source of capacity has an impact on the consequences for 
outage. 
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2. Power market theory 
This chapter gives information that should be known in order to understand the results. The 
chapter is divided into two main parts: Description of electricity markets and description of 
the power market simulator EMPS. The first part involves explanation of market functions as 
well as an introduction of different market solutions. The second part introduces the 
simulation tool used for all simulations, EMPS (EFIs Multi-area Power-market Simulator).  
2.1 Electricity market  
The aim of the section is to introduce important knowledge of how the electricity market 
settles, as well as information about different market solutions.  
2.1.1 Market dynamics 
The price is set at the equilibrium where producers are willing to sell and consumer to pay 
known as the market cross, illustrated by p* in Figure 2.1. With marginal pricing, producers 
bid their marginal production cost into the market, usually with hourly resolution. At the 
intersection, the price is set for the hour and the amount determined.  
 
Figure 2.1: Market cross including consumer and producer surplus (Doorman, TET4185 Power markets 
- Micro economics, 2013). 
In Figure 2.1, producer surplus is the grey area beneath p*, and Consumer Surplus above. 
Simplified, the sum of producer and consumer surplus for all areas in the evaluated system 
gives the socio-economic surplus. More advanced, socio-economic surplus consists also of 
change in water level during the evaluated period, transmission loss and congestion rent. 
Socio-economic surplus is used to evaluate consequences from a system perspective, taking 
into account various stakeholders like producers, consumers and system operators. 
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The demand curve presented in the figure above is rather flat, i.e. highly elastic. This means 
that consumers adjust their consumption when prices change.  
However, electricity consumers do not always really see price signals. This means that when 
there are less power production available and prices rise, it is not obvious that consumers 
reduce their power consumption. Figure 2.2 gives a more realistic demand slope. If the 
market cross now change, the quantity of demand does not vary significantly.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: Market cross illustrating less elastic demand. 
This steepness of the curves does affect how much consumer and producer surplus changes 
if the price vary. The demand curve is steeper than the supply curve. This means that a 
change in price affects consumer surplus more than producer surplus, since the change in 
area is greater. 
RES share of the total power consumption increases, as seen in Figure 2.3. For the future, 
more renewables are expected to enter the power system in order to reach climatic goals 
set by the EU. The installed capacity mix is changing towards being less flexible.  
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Figure 2.3: Net generation capacity evolution in Europe (ENTSO-E, 2014). 
The capacity mix affects the supply curve slope. In a power system greatly influenced by RES, 
there will be a shift in supply curve to the right, as illustrated in Figure 2.4. RES have low 
marginal cost due to free fuel, and is located at the very left in the supply curve. The low 
marginal cost refers to the actual power production cost of producing one extra unit of 
energy. As illustrated in Figure 2.4, the extra RES supply reduces the price as the market 
cross shifts to the right. The most expensive unit without RES (first market cross) is no longer 
producing.  
 
Figure 2.4: Market cross with and without renewables (Benedettini, 2015). 
A disadvantage of RES is the uncertainty of when wind and solar energy are available. This 
intermittence of RES means that the arrow indicating the extra production in Figure 2.4, 
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often turns. When the previous additional quantity from RES is no longer available, the high 
priced unit will now again be wanted in order to meet demand. 
Periods with high prices indicate power capacity shortage. Production units with high 
marginal cost are active, drawing prices up. When demand reaches the capacity limit of the 
peak generator, prices often increase rapidly. The peak generator is the unit in the system 
with highest marginal cost. If demand is above the capacity of the peak generator, there is 
need for flexible load or load rationing. Flexible load is load that is disconnected stepwise at 
high prices, contractual pre-determined with the system operator. Rationing is involuntary 
load shedding (very high price) as a last measure to keep system in operation.  
The peak capacity is illustrated in Figure 2.5. Here, supply curve is the MC-curve (Marginal 
Cost). Kmax shows the capacity limit of all available capacity. At the very edge of the peak 
generator, the supply curve is totally elastic, i.e. vertical. No matter how far the price 
increase, the quantity supplied is unchanged. There are no more available capacity, so all 
quantity wanted by demand exceeding the capacity limit need to be fulfilled by use of 
flexible load or load rationing.  
 
Figure 2.5: Short run marginal cost pricing (Joskow, 2006). 
Scarcity pricing could occur during power capacity shortage. Production capacity is exceeded 
and prices are determined by demand. This way, also the peak generator is able to make 
money (return of investments). In Figure 2.6, scarcity rent is the area between the marginal 
cost of the peak generator and the intersection of supply and demand. 
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Figure 2.6: Electricity pricing with power capacity constraint (Joskow, 2006). 
Area pricing is one method to handle power congestions, i.e. technical transmission 
bottlenecks. This is illustrated for a system consisting of two “price areas” in Figure 2.7. If 
they were totally disconnected, i.e. no exchange capacity, the price in area A would be 75, 
and in B 125 NOK/MWh. If a transmission link with capacity of 100 MW is connected 
between the areas, the price increases in area A to 100, and reduces in area B to 100. It is 
exactly enough capacity to have equal price in both areas. However, if the capacity were less 
than 100 MW, there would be price differences due to the bottleneck. 
 
Figure 2.7: Exchange between two price areas (Doorman, TET4185 Power markets - Grid access & 
Congestion Management, 2013). 
2.1.2 Market solutions 
The power market should give the right price signal to all stakeholders, i.e. providing an 
efficient and reliable power system. Recently, the development towards a production mix 
with more renewables creates merit-order effect in an Energy-Only Market (EOM). Merit-
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order effect is to prefer low marginal cost energy sources. This affects the utilization time of 
conventional power plants due to their higher marginal cost.  
EOM and capacity mechanisms 
In EOM, producers bid amounts of energy to specific prices. The only payment is for the 
actual production in energy. However, the marginal cost for different production types 
differ. Wind and solar have very low marginal cost (no fuel cost, only operational cost), and 
will produce as long as resources are available. Fossil-fired units are assumed to have no 
resource restriction, but higher marginal cost and start/stop issues. The “no resource 
assumption” means that all wanted fuel (coal, oil, gas etc.) is available.  
A variety of factors result in financial challenges for thermal power plants, known as “missing 
money”. The merit order effect is one of them. It reduces the operation hours for thermal 
generators. This reduces, or even eliminates their profit, making them financial insecure. 
However, in a power system, flexible capacity is a necessity, which intermittent renewables 
physically cannot fulfil. The market must provide the right price signals to keep enough 
flexible production (back-up capacity) in the system, or incentivise new investments.   
Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM) objective is to provide security of supply. CRM 
aim to ensure that there is enough installed capacity in the system to meet peak electricity 
demand in the future. This is called system adequacy. Such mechanism pays for capacity 
(MW, kW) outside the normal power market on top of any power they produce. The 
mechanisms intend to be technology neutral, but with certain criteria like minimum size. 
This opens for participation for generation types as fossil-fired units, nuclear, hydropower, 
renewables and flexible consumers. The main difference between EOM and CRM is 
illustrated in Figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8: Main difference between EOM and CRM 
The cost of CRM is given to the consumers, as they are the only ones to utilize electricity. 
However, this extra payment benefits security of supply as well as extinguishes missing 
money issue for producers. CRM is then an expensive solution but might be preferred 
instead of involuntary load shedding and unstable system operation. 
CRM status for Europe 
The implementation and characteristics of such mechanisms differ. Figure 2.9 shows status 
for CRM in Europe as of 2014.  
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Figure 2.9: Implementation of CRM in Europe, as of June 2014 (EURELECTRIC, 2014). 
The CRM used in Great Britain (GB) is capacity auction. The auction is a sub-category of 
capacity markets. The first auction was December 18, 2014. The needed capacity to ensure 
that peak demand is met for 2018/19 is estimated up front. Producers bid their capacity, 
promising the capacity will be available when needed. The reverse auction drives prices 
down and the cheapest capacity wins contracts. (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 
2015) 
Most renewables are ineligible to participate in the capacity market. In GB, renewables 
cannot enter the capacity market until support from other subsidies (Renewable 
Obligation/Contracts for Difference) is expired. They also need to fulfil the size-criterion. 
However, fossil-fired, nuclear, CHP and demand-side response are included. (Allen & Overy, 
2013) 
There is still a discussion if capacity mechanism should be implemented in Germany. 
Norway has no capacity issue. Energy-only market is therefore sufficient. 
Cross-border participation in CRM 
CRM participation could also go beyond national borders. This would optimise cross border 
capacity, as well as compensate for their contribution to security of supply. Through the 
Guidance Package, the European Commission requires that CRM is to be open for foreign 
participation for other Member States (European Commission). This is also in line with the 
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European Commission’s target for the Internal Energy Market (IEM), which aim to 
coordinate and strongly interconnect the European system (European Commission, 2015). 
Eurelectric, representing 3,500 companies in power generation, distribution, and supply in 
Europe, agrees with the European Commission on inclusion of cross-border participation in 
CRM. (EURELECTRIC, 2013). Despite of this, the design of such participation seems to meet 
challenges.  
For the first capacity market auction in GB, it was not possible for foreign participation. This 
was due to complexity of interaction with the European market. The Government’s view was 
that “it is not appropriate for interconnectors to participate directly in a capacity market as 
interconnectors are primarily transmission infrastructure and therefore do not directly 
provide capacity”. However, GB is committed through the European Commission to work on 
a solution for this in the future. (Allen & Overy, 2013) 
Allen & Overy suggests certain criteria that need to be fulfilled before allowing foreign 
participation. One solution is to let foreign power producers participate directly into the GB 
capacity market. Issues raised are then how to ensure that the plant actually delivers power 
to GB during stressed operations. Additionally, the plant should only receive capacity 
payment from one CRM at the time, it need to fulfil size-criterion and provide energy when 
needed. Another issue is whether the foreign capacity should reserve physical transmission 
rights.  (Allen & Overy, 2013) 
Eurelectric has also some proposals for cross-border participation. The main lines are that all 
participations must fulfil the same requirements and rules. It should only be allowed to 
participate in one CRM at a time. There should not be any cross-border capacity reservation 
for CRM. This final proposal means that the participation of CRM should not affect any other 
market involvements. Capacity can participate in other markets, like day-ahead, intraday and 
balancing markets, without any restrictions due to the participation of cross-border CRM. 
(EURELECTRIC, 2013)  
Eurelectric propose models for cross-border participation. The main question is who is to be 
allowed to participate: the producers or the interconnector. Eurelectric also identifies that 
the product delivered vary. Should availability be paid for, or the actual delivery. The 
different proposals are presented in Figure 2.10.  (EURELECTRIC, 2014) 
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Figure 2.10: Options for cross-border participation in capacity markets (EURELECTRIC, 2014). 
Eurelectric supports Model A from Figure 2.10. Their argument is that this model minimizes 
market distortion, and guarantees producers to participate, not regulated entities. 
Eurelectric do not see such participation as beneficial because interconnectors then 
compete with market participants, like generators, flexible consumer etc. Interconnectors 
will only profit from congestion rent in this model, i.e. price difference between areas. 
Model B and D might influence the merit order, as delivery is the product. This means that 
forced delivery outside the merit order might be preferred, distorting energy markets. 
Model C has the drawback of participation of the interconnector (EURELECTRIC, 2014).   
Penalties for not providing obliged capacity 
There should be penalties if the participants of CRM do not provide the desired capacity. 
Allen & Overy proposed that capacity participants are penalised if they do not fulfil its 
obligation given a 4-hour notice in advance of a stressed situation. The penalty is based on 
the amounted obligation and the value of lost load (rationing price) minus imbalance charge 
during the period of stress. Despite of this, exception from penalty could be valid if there are 
technical failures in the transmission grid: “where there is unmet demand or voltage 
reduction because of failures or deficiencies in the transmission or distribution systems, 
capacity market penalties will not apply” (Allen & Overy, 2013). 
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2.2 Power market simulator 
The power market simulator used in this report is EMPS, developed by SINTEF Energy 
Research. EMPS is a well-known simulation tool used within the Nordic area, providing 
market analysis and price forecasts among other.  
The data set used is developed by SINTEF, and intend to resemble the power system 
structure in year 2030. The data set is extensively described in a TWENTIES report evaluating 
possibilities of Nordic hydropower generation flexibility and transmission capacity expansion 
to support the integration of Northern European wind power production (Farahmand, 
Jaehnert, Aigner, & Huertas-Hernando, 2013). The only difference from the 2030 grid 
presented in the master thesis is that the offshore power grid is removed. This offshore grid 
connected intended wind farms in the North Sea together, providing additional exchange 
possibilities.   
For comparison reasons, a data set for 2010 is used. This data set is also developed by 
SINTEF and is presented extensively in the Twenties report referred to above (Farahmand, 
Jaehnert, Aigner, & Huertas-Hernando, 2013).  
2.2.1 EMPS main principles 
The power market simulator run a data set with a given installed capacity. The power system 
evaluated in this report is for year 2030 except of one comparison to a data set for 2010. 
Given this system, different climatic years from historical records are run. Variations in 
inflow, precipitation, solar, wind etc. can then be evaluated for a specific data set. There are 
75 climatic years that are simulated. This is recorded from year 1931 to 2005. 
The simulation tool optimizes with respect to socio-economic surplus. EMPS aim to optimise 
the use of water resources, taking uncertain inflow and thermal production into account. 
Water has an opportunity cost, i.e. the water used today cannot be used tomorrow. The 
opportunity cost, known as the water value gives the water a marginal cost, used for 
production planning in a system containing different production units (SINTEF, 2012). 
The simulator is divided into a strategy phase and simulation phase. First, the strategy 
computes water values for hydro areas, creating a long term strategy of utilizing the 
reservoir. Then, the simulation takes different climatic years into account, verifying the 
strategy determined. 
In order to emphasize variability in wind and solar production, sequential resolution is used 
instead of weekly. Each sequence is 2 hours during the weekdays and 4 hours in the 
weekend. Each week consists then of 72 sequences. 
EMPS is a transport model, i.e. there are no underlying power flow. Each country is divided 
into areas, and the data set has 56 areas in total included, resembling Northern Europe and 
its interconnections. Exchange at the borders of the data set is modelled by a fixed exchange 
based on historical data. This way, also exchange outside the simulated areas are taken into 
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account. AC transmission limitation is included in the model by a reduced transmission 
capacity factor of 0.7 (Farahmand, Jaehnert, Aigner, & Huertas-Hernando, 2013).  
2.2.2 Allocation and aggregation 
In EMPS, hydro areas can be modelled both with aggregated and allocated production. An 
illustration of the aggregation is shown in Figure 2.11. Usually, hydro areas are first 
aggregated in the strategy part, before the production is allocated to each plant in the 
simulation part. There are also a connection between these modules, ensuring that the 
optimal strategy on aggregated level is possible when allocating it to each plant as well. 
However, this allocation is time consuming. Therefore, under some circumstances, it is 
beneficial to solve everything on aggregated level. However, this leads to loss of some 
details as coupling between reservoirs. Thermal areas are always modelled on aggregated 
level.  
 
Figure 2.11: Aggregation of hydro areas [user manual EMPS]. 
2.2.3 Rationing and flexible load 
Rationing is performed when load is disconnected involuntarily due to lack of power 
production. The price of involuntary load shedding should correspond to the loss for 
consumers if electricity is unavailable. The price for rationing is set to be 3000 EUR/MWh in 
the model. This is significantly higher than the most expensive production unit (136.5 
EUR/MWh). This method shows how the involuntarily part is taken into account. Producers 
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will always try to produce energy when the price rises so high – even if the need for power is 
only for short periods.  
Flexible load is included between the most expensive production unit and rationing.  Like 
production units, flexible load has stepwise resolution with different amounts to different 
prices.  
2.2.4 Thermal power production 
Fossil fuel is assumed constant in cost, but with CO2-price increasing from 13 to 44 EUR/ton 
for year 2010 and 2030 respectively, following current policy. 
A “cold start” could last up to several days, depending on the production source. Start-up 
costs in thermal-based areas should therefore be included to adapt to the real situation. 
Then, the marginal cost of thermal units does not just take fuel cost into account, but also 
emphasizing start and stop cost.  
If the area price for one hour is below the marginal cost, the unit would, without start-up 
cost included, be shut down during this hour and started again the hour after. However, if 
the start-up cost is included, the area price can be below the marginal cost and the 
production unit continue producing, as long as the deviation is less than the start-up cost.  
If this extra cost is included, the prices are more volatile due to more power production than 
necessary in some hours, and less in others, i.e. producers are not willing to turn off for 
certain low-priced hours, and require higher price to turn on.   
Regarding EMPS, including start-up increases the calculation time significantly.  
For the market cross, including start-up cost interrupts the merit order. In the real power 
market, this cost could be taken into account through “block-bids”, which are bids into the 
spot market that goes over several hours.  
2.2.5 Exchange capacity from Norway to continental Europe 
In 2010, the total exchange capacity was 1.6 GW, 0.7 GW NorNed and 0.9 GW at Skagerrak 
1-3 respectively. This capacity is expected to increase. Figure 2.12 shows the expected 
exchange capacity development from the Nordic synchronous area in 2020. Skagerrak 4 (0.7 
GW) was commissioned in December, 2014. It is decided to build 1.4 GW connecting Norway 
to Germany (Nord.Link) and the link is expected to be commissioned in 2018. It is also 
decided to build 1.4 GW connecting Norway and Great Britain (NSN), which is expected to be 
commissioned in 2020 (Statnett SF, 2013). Additionally, NorNed II with 0.7 GW is included in 
the data set for 2030. This increases the total HVDC-cable exchange capacity from Norway 
by 4.2 GW.    
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Figure 2.12: Capacity development from the Nordic synchronous area 2020. (Statnett SF, 2013). 
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3. Transmission cable and production outage study 
This chapter consists of statistical unavailability data for HVDC-cables and different types of 
power plants as well as a description of the outage modelling.  
3.1 Unavailability statistics  
The following sections present unavailability statistics for HVDC-cables and production units.  
3.1.1 HVDC-cables 
The European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENSTO-E) develops 
yearly HVDC-statistics for cables connected to or within the Nordic synchronous area. A sub-
group of ENTSO-E named Regional Group Nordic collects the following statistics. The group 
has participations from Transmission System Operators (TSO) in all Nordic countries. 
HVDC is preferred to transfer energy over great distances in front of HVAC. This is mainly 
due to no reactive power loss, as well as smaller cross section needed to transfer equal 
amounts of power.  
Figure 3.1 allocates the links geographically for 2014. In total, 15 cables, with a technical 
exchange capacity of 70.5 TWh/year are connected. The exchange capacity to the Nordic 
synchronous area is 6.6 GW. (Regional Group Nordic, 2014) 
 
Figure 3.1: HVDC-cables overview connected to or within the Nordic Synchronous area. (Regional 
Group Nordic, 2014). 
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Figure 3.2 presents the utilization of HVDC-links separated by unavailable, transmission and 
technical capacity not used. The entire pillar is Emax. Emax is the maximum energy that can be 
transferred including losses.  
Statistics from 2012 and 2013 are used, due to the recently more consistent reporting 
(statistics for 2014 are not published yet). EstLink 2 was commissioned in 2014, so statistics 
for this link is left out. 
 
Figure 3.2: Annual overview of HVDC-links in 2013 (Regional Group Nordic, 2014). 
EU is used to identify unavailable exchange capacity. EU is the affected transfer capacity 
multiplied with the time of unavailability. In 2013, the EU on average for all links was 13.2 %. 
The corresponding statistics for 2012 was 11 %. (Regional Group Nordic, 2013) Combined, 
the average EU is 12.1 %. 
Subcategories of unavailable are disturbance outage, maintenance, other outage and 
limitations. Disturbance outage is defined as “forced or unintended disconnection or failed 
reconnection as a result of faults in the power grid“. (Regional Group Nordic, 2013) Often, a 
forced unplanned outage is a valid description. Limitation is usually referring to the events in 
the interconnected AC-grid that affect the exchange capacity.  
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The share of subcategories for unavailability varies. In addition to disturbance outage, 
maintenance of the link including its stations and limitation in AC-grid are major factors. 
Limitation in AC-grid is often a result of maintenance or upgrading here. Both of these 
categories are usually possible to perform at suited time in order to reduce consequences. 
Figure 3.3 shows subcategories of the figure above for NorNed, split over the year. The 
unavailable exchange capacity in 2013 was 19 %. The majority of the unavailable capacity 
was due to disturbance outage, and small parts due to limitation and maintenance of the 
cable. Limitations on NordNed are usually caused by maintenance or work in the 
interconnected AC-grid. Limitations and maintenance of the cable are therefore usually 
predictable, and can be carried out on suited time. The figure below shows that both are 
greatly influencing the exchange on late summer – a period that usually do not depend so 
much on exchange capacity due to low load.  
 
Figure 3.3: Share of energy on NorNed divided over the year (Regional Group Nordic, 2014). 
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 presents the unavailability (EU) of all cables in 2012 and 2013 
caused by disturbance outage in percent of Emax. There were some extensive outages in the 
evaluated years, affecting Fenno-Skan 1 and 2, the Baltic cable and NorNed. The highest EU 
caused by disturbance outage did reach 25 % of the annual Emax. This resembles 13 weeks 
with no exchange capacity. These events confirm that outages might restrain the exchange 
capacity significantly.  
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Figure 3.4: Unavailability due to disturbance outages in 2012 (Regional Group Nordic, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Unavailability due to disturbance outages in 2013 (notice the change in x-axis compared 
to previous figure) (Regional Group Nordic, 2014). 
The average EU caused by disturbance outages in the period 2012-2013 was 4.7 %. 
Converted to weeks this is 2.4 weeks/year per cable. The number of disturbance outages 
varied between 0 and 14, with an average of 4 events. (Regional Group Nordic, 2013; 
Regional Group Nordic, 2014) 
Tree numbers from the HVDC-cable statistics are referred to later in the report. These are 
the average EU of 12.1 % (6 weeks), the average EU caused by disturbance outage of 4.7 % 
(2.4 weeks) as well as the highest EU caused by disturbance outage of 25 % (13 weeks). 
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3.1.2 Power production units  
There are several sources of statistical data for production units and their unavailability. In 
this report, statistics from ENTSO-E and EURELECTRIC are considered. 
Statistics from ENTSO-E 
ENTSO-E delivers yearly statistics and adequacy of the European power system, including 
specific statistics for production units. ENSTO-E represents 41 TSOs from 34 countries across 
Europe. (ENTSO-E, 2014) 
Table 3.1 presents the power balance for December in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Outages, a sub 
category of Unavailable Capacity gives the capacity in [GW] unavailable due to an outage. 
ENTSOE defines outages as forced outage, which is in line with RGN’s definition of 
disturbance outage. The amount is relatively constant, about 2.4 % of Net Generation 
Capacity (NGC) on average. This number is found by using the average unavailable capacity 
caused by outage for December in the period 2011-2013, and dividing it by the NGC in the 
same period. However, the amount is on aggregated level, and does not reveal the 
production source details.  
Table 3.1: ENTSO-E power balance for December 2011-2013 (ENTSO-E, 2014). 
 
Figure 3.6 presents sub categories of unavailable capacity during 2013 on a European level. 
The share of outages compared to NGC seems rather stable over the year. Outages vary 
between 2.3 % and 3.2 % (between 22.5 and 31.8 GW respectively) of NGC over the year. 
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(ENTSO-E, 2014) The figure also reveals that maintenance & overhauls provide a significant 
share of the unavailable capacity for production units. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Unavailable capacity and its structure overview in 2013 (ENTSO-E, 2014). 
Statistics from EURELECTRIC 
The Union of the Electricity Industry (EURELECTRIC) represents participants of the electricity 
industry within Europe, as well as some countries outside the continent. (EURELECTRIC, 
2012) 
Their report Power Statistics & Trend 2012 provides more detailed unavailability statistics for 
production units than ENTSO-E. The detail level separates fossil-fired units from other 
production sources.  
EURELECTRIC divides unavailability into two sub categories: planned and unplanned 
unavailability. The relation is shown in Figure 3.7. Planned unavailability means that the 
unavailability was determined more than 4 weeks in front of the event. This category can be 
resembled to “maintenance” in statistics for cable outages developed by Region Group 
Nordic. Unplanned unavailability is detainable less than 4 weeks in front of the event. 
Further, the sub categories “postponable” or “not postponable” are determined by whether 
it can be detained by 12 hours or not. 
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Figure 3.7: Definitions of availability and utilisation of power plants (EURELECTRIC, 2012). 
The category used for disturbance outage in cable statistics developed by Regional Group 
Nordic (ENTSO-E) and production statistics developed by EURELECTRIC do not entirely fulfil 
each other. However, it is assumed that unplanned unavailability that are not postponable 
resembles disturbance outage (forced outage) in the cable statistics.  
Table 3.2 shows availability and unavailability of fossil-fired units for the period 2002 to 
2011. The gathered statistics are from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland and Portugal - representing a total net capacity of 788.8 GW.  
Table 3.2: Availability statistics of fossil-fired units 2002-2011 (EU countries AT, CZ, DE, FR, IT, NL, PL, 
PT) (EURELECTRIC, 2012). 
 
Fossil-fired units are unavailable due to unplanned not postponable events 6.2 % of total on 
a ten-year average. This corresponds to an annualised outage of 3.2 weeks. 
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3.2 Outage simulation 
Nord.Link, the intended 1.4 GW connection between Norway and Germany, is used to 
investigate outage. However, the exact link investigated is not that important. The 
importance is that outage is modelled on a link between hydro dominated and thermal-
based areas consisting of much wind and solar. This is due to the different production 
structures. These areas can utilize each other as the correlation between available resources 
are not that strong. If an outage then reduce the exchange capacity, the consequences are 
more visible than if the production structures on both sides were equal. 
3.2.1 Outage modelling 
All transmission outages simulated in this report are unexpected, i.e. not included in the 
strategy part. This is done by using the strategy computed for the system without outage, 
and then implement an outage directly in the simulation part. This way, producers do not 
know about the outage before the very moment it occur. For hydro areas, this affect 
planned production and water levels.  
The same approach is done for production outage: Strategy is computed without any 
outage, while the simulation take the outage into account. Two gas power plants in Germany 
with a total capacity of 1.4 GW are closed for a specific period. Their marginal cost were 61.8 
and 64.5 EUR/MWh. This is medium prices for such units in the data set for 2030. 
Only one yearly outage is implemented with a certain duration in each simulation. This 
outage lasts for the exact same period each of the 75 climatic simulated years. The number 
of outages (split in several periods over the year) is not important. The importance is 
whether capacity is available when needed. This is during tight operations. Therefore, all 
evaluated outage periods start at the beginning of the first week each year. The chance of 
power capacity shortage is greater because load is relatively high at this time. 
3.2.2 Outage length 
The average energy unavailable caused by disturbance outage for 2012-2013 was 4.7 % of 
Emax per cable. This resembles an annualized outage period of 2.4 weeks. The main 
simulation for transmission outage uses then 3 weeks outage length due to the weekly 
outage resolution in the model.  
However, some cables did experience greater reduction in exchange. The highest 
unavailability caused by disturbance outage exceeded 25 % of Emax on yearly basis. This 
resembles 13 weeks with loss of exchange capacity. Such long run events are taken into 
consideration in sensitivity analysis. The longest modelled transmission outage lasts for 15 
weeks. 
3 weeks outage is the outage length for fossil-fired production units. This is due to two 
factors: First, fossil-fired production units were found to have an historical annualized 
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outage period of 3.2 weeks. Secondly, it makes the results directly comparable to the main 
exchange outage period.   
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4. Results 
The results intend to show consequences of transmission and production outages in order to 
evaluate the importance of their individual availability.  
The first section provides assumptions for the following results. Further, the result chapter is 
divided into three main parts:  
 Transmission cable outage 
 Power production outage 
 Impact of including start-up cost for thermal power plants  
Table 4.1 shows the content of the three main sections. The sections are presented in the 
same order as listed below, starting from the left top, and going vertically down.   
Table 4.1: Overview of the chapter 
Extensively 
investigated 
Transmission 
cable outage 
Production 
outage 
Start-up cost 
included 
EOM – Worst year X X X 
EOM – Median year X   
CRM – Worst year X   
 
Transmission outage is the most extensive section including analysis of different market 
solutions, i.e. different amounts of thermal capacity installed. Each response is extensively 
documented. This is done to provide information of the model, as well as verifying the 
results.  
The Production outage section includes outage of thermal power production with the same 
capacity as the transmission cable. It shortly presents consequences in price and surpluses 
for various stakeholders. 
Impact of including start-up cost for thermal power plants section evaluates the impact of 
start-up cost in the simulations. Start-up cost is left out in all previous simulations because 
these calculations are very time consuming. This section evaluates the validity of all the 
simulations that do not consider this extra cost.    
In the end of the result chapter there is a comparison between prices in Norway for power 
system configurations in 2010 and in 2030. These simulations are performed to see how 
Norwegian prices are affected by the expected increase in exchange capacity to continental 
Europe. 
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4.1 Assumptions 
All simulations are done in EMPS mainly with a data set for year 2030. The last section, 
however, uses a data set for 2010. The model and its data set are presented in section 2.2.  
All outages affect the intended cable Nord.Link, interconnecting Norway and Germany. 
Further information of the outage modelling is presented in section 3.2. 
The outage simulations are divided into two parts: Energy-Only Market (EOM) and Capacity 
Remuneration Mechanism (CRM). CRM is modelled as increased thermal capacity in 
Germany. A detailed explanation of these market solutions are presented in section 2.1.2.  
Furthermore, the first five weeks of the year are extensively analysed. This is a critical period 
due to higher chance of stressed situations, i.e. lack of power production. The beginning of 
the year has high load and usually lower production, especially from solar energy.  
The analyses are done for the worst year with high prices and the median year with a normal 
price level. Both years are chosen from the yearly average price in Germany from the system 
without any outage. Given the data set of 2030, the worst year is the climatic year of 1973, 
and the median 1981.  
Each outage starts from the beginning of week 1. Each week consists of 168 hours, and one 
year is 8760 hours. 
All prices are weighted prices, i.e. the price of the system values the amount of energy in 
each price area. In this way, a small area with high prices does not have large impact on the 
average prices.  
All socio-economic surpluses and consumer surpluses presented are yearly surpluses. 
  
27 
 
4.2 Transmission cable outage 
The simulations intend to reveal market consequences for cable outages that limits the 
exchange between hydro- and thermal-based areas.  
Table 4.2 shows the three parts of the transmission cable outage section. The sub-sections 
are presented in the same order as listed below, starting from the top, and going vertically 
down.   
Table 4.2: Overview of the transmission outage section 
Extensively 
investigated 
Transmission 
cable outage 
EOM – Worst year X 
EOM – Median year X 
CRM – Worst year X 
 
4.2.1 Energy-only market - worst year 
The first part gives an overview of the worst year power situation in the system. 
Consequences in prices and surpluses of various stakeholders appear in the end of this 
section.  
Load 
Figure 4.1 shows the firm load in Germany for the first five weeks (840 hours). The load is 
relatively low up to hour 170 because of the holydays, with daily fluctuations caused by the 
day/night consumption, as well as lower load in the weekends. The load then reaches 100 
GW. The day/night difference is about 25 % of the total load. The capacity of 1.4 GW of 
Nord.Link is small compared to the peak load (1.4 %). 
It should be mentioned that the load in Germany follows a yearly unchanged pattern for all 
75 simulated years. 
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Figure 4.1: Firm load the first five weeks in Germany. 
Wind and solar power production 
Figure 4.2 (1) shows wind production on average and in the worst year in Germany for the 
first five weeks. Overall, the worst year has low wind production compared to the average of 
all 75 simulated climatic years. Still, there is great volatility, and power production vary 
between 1 and 30 GW in this period. At its maximum, production from wind has a share of 
almost 1/3 of the peak load in Germany. 
Figure 4.2 (2) emphasizes the intermittence of solar production. Production in the worst year 
varies between 0 and 21 GW, with evident daily fluctuations. However, also the average 
goes down to zero production at night.  
When comparing the figures, it is clear that only coincidences decide the amount of wind 
and solar energy. It is evident that a system dominated by such units needs sufficient back 
up generation to avoid power capacity shortage. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.2: Production in the first five weeks in Germany from (1) wind and (2) solar energy. 
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Exchange 
Figure 4.3 (1) shows that Nord.Link, with its capacity of 1.4 GW, usually exchange power 
from Norway to Germany these first five weeks in the worst year. However, when wind 
production is high and the load in Germany low, the flow turns.  
Three specific periods sticks out: around the hours 330, 490 and 620. When comparing these 
figures to the previous figures for Germany, hour 330 has high wind, low solar and high load. 
The exchange is close to zero. At hour 490, the wind is high, solar is medium, but load is low. 
The exchange has turned, and Norway imports energy. At the final peak, hour 620, wind is at 
its peak with almost 30 GW, solar is low, and load is low. At this point, the capacity is used to 
exchange power from Germany to Norway. It seems to be a strong correlation between 
wind production and exchange to Norway.  
However, when outage occurs for three weeks, as confirmed in Figure 4.3 (2), the link is 
unavailable and the previous net export from Norway is reduced. Given these results, it is 
assumed that the outage gives higher prices in Germany.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.3: Exchange on Nord.Link referred to Norway the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) 
no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
When outage occurs on Nord.Link, rerouted power flow through other links could be 
assumed to cover the loss of one link. However, this does not seem to be the case. Figure 4.4 
shows exchange on NorNed and Skagerrak 1-4, respectively connecting Norway to the 
Netherlands and west-Denmark. There are close to no visible changes in exchange when 
outage occurs on Nord.Link.  
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(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.4: Exchange on NorNed and Skagerrak 1-4 referred to Norway the first five weeks in the 
worst year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
Figure 4.5 shows power exchange on NSN for the first five weeks of the worst year. NSN 
connects Norway to Great Britain. When outage of Nord.Link occurs, it is observed that more 
energy is transferred from Norway to Great Britain. The energy export referred to Norway 
increases by 95 GWh when outage occurs on Nord.Link. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.5: Exchange on NSN referred to Norway the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) no 
outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
However, as Figure 4.6 shows, there is a great congestion on the link between Netherlands 
and Great Britain. The rated exchange capacity towards continental Europe is full in the 
worst year. The outage of Nord.Link cannot be compensated by extra power flow through 
Great Britain. This also explains the extra flow on NSN. It is not due to the desire of more 
power import to continental Europe. It is desired to export power from Norway.  
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(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.6: Exchange on Netherlands-GB referred to Netherlands the first five weeks in the worst year 
with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
There are also links from Denmark to Germany and Sweden to Germany (Baltic cable). These 
cables follow the same pattern as the presented links above: There are close to no visible 
changes in exchange when outage occurs on Nord.Link, because their capacity is already 
exploited in hours with power capacity shortage on the continent. The power flow from 
Denmark and Sweden to Germany are presented in Appendix A.  
It is clear that if transmission cable outage occurs in hours with power capacity shortage on 
the continent, there is not necessarily available capacity on other links to cover the loss of 
power exchange.  
Flexible load  
Flexible load is used to compensate for power production shortage. 136.5 EUR/MWh is the 
marginal cost of the most expensive production unit in Germany. When prices exceed this, 
all available production units produce their rated capacity. 
Figure 4.7 (1) shows activation of flexible load in Germany without outage of Nord.Link for 
the first five weeks in the worst year. The use of flexible load is high between hours 200-300, 
peaking 6 GW at highest value. These periods have low wind, medium solar and high load. 
The distinct fluctuating peaks are due to the day/night consumption.  
Overall, it seems to be a strong correlation between wind energy and use of flexible load. 
The only low wind period without use of flexible load is up to hour 200 (first week). Here, 
flexible load is not necessary due to the low load caused by the holidays.   
Figure 4.7 (2) shows the use of flexible load in Germany with Nord.Link out for three weeks. 
The direct consequence is 1.4 GW unavailable exchange capacity. Comparing these figures to 
each other, this amount is possible to recognize. The very high peaks around hours 200-300 
increase by approximately 1.4 GW when Nord.Link is out. The spikes around hour 400 
increase by 0.6 GW. However, the price peaks between hours 700-800 do not seem to 
change at all. This is due to Nord.Link is put in operation after hour 504 (three weeks). 
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Knowing that use of flexible load is expensive, these figures indicate that the price in 
Germany is high, and that the outage makes prices even higher. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.7: Flexible load in Germany the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 
weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
Prices 
Figure 4.8 shows price percentiles for all 75 climatic years in Germany (1) without outage, 
and (2) with 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. The average price is close to unchanged, even 
though there is a noticeable rice in the 100.percentile during the outage period (up to hour 
504). However, the prices seem relatively unchanged throughout the year, emphasizing a 
lack in capacity, not an energy issue. If there were an energy issue, higher production in one 
period would affect the next, as there would be a change in available resources (e.g. stored 
water). In thermal areas, there are no such resource issue as nothing is stored, and the 
availability of resource is infinite (gas, oil, coal, etc.). Higher use in one period does not 
change the availability of resource in the next, and not the price. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.8: Price percentiles in Germany with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
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Figure 4.9 shows prices in the first five weeks of the worst year in Germany. Due to lack of 
power production, prices in certain hours are far above the marginal cost of any production 
unit (136.5 EUR/MWh), confirming activation of expensive flexible load. Overall, the price 
pattern fits the flexible load pattern well. When large amounts are activated, prices increase 
accordingly. 
Spikes during the outage period (up to hour 504) rises noticeable when comparing the 
figures below. However, spikes after this period are unchanged. This confirms that power 
production in Germany during the outage period does not affect the power production after.  
For periods with power capacity shortage, 1.4 GW exchange capacity is important. The lack 
of power in the worst year rises peak prices to 900 EUR/MWh (about 9 NOK/kWh) and the 
average price by 7.7 EUR/MWh.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.9: Prices in Germany the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks 
outage of Nord.Link. 
Figure 4.10 shows price percentiles in Norway for all 75 climatic years. Some new price peaks 
exceeding 120 EUR/MWh occur after the three-week (lasts until hour 504) outage of 
Nord.Link. Some dry years suffer from unavailable exchange in the first three-weeks, 
resulting in lower reservoir level during the year and higher prices. However, the average 
price due to Nord.Link outage reduces by 0.1 EUR/MWh for all 75 climatic years.  
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Figure 4.10: Price percentiles in Norway with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
Figure 4.11 shows prices in Norway for the first five weeks of the worst year (in Germany). 
When outage occur, the direct link between Norway and Germany is unavailable, slightly 
reducing the five-week average price in Norway, as well as reducing some high peaks. The 
source of income from Germany is no longer available, resulting in lower price. Equally, the 
reservoir level increase due to lower production, and increasing water also reduce the 
prices. However, it is clear that the outage of Nord.Link for the worst year gives no 
significant consequence in Norway. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.11: Prices in Norway the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks 
outage of Nord.Link. 
Great Britain is not strongly connected to the continent illustrated by the great price 
difference in Figure 4.12. However, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands are strongly 
interconnected. Still, prices are overall highest in Germany. Such strong interconnected 
areas are challenged by the domino effect: If one area suffers, the other areas follow. The 
outage of Nord.Link rises prices in several countries, including Denmark. 
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The resolution in Figure 4.12 is not necessary correct below 60 EUR/MWh. All dark blue 
areas have prices below this, but the resolution is chosen this way to visualize changes in 
high price areas.  
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.12: Area prices the first five weeks in Northern Europe in the worst year with (1) no outage 
and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
Surplus of various stakeholders 
The simulation tool optimizes with respect to socio-economic surplus. The optimization is 
interrupted when system changes occur. Figure 4.13 presents a sensitivity analysis showing 
the relation between outage length of Nord.Link and change in socio-economic surplus for 
the system. The outage length varies between 1 and 15 weeks. The highest amount of 
energy not transferred caused by disturbance outage on HVDC-cables in the period 2012-
2013 did reach 25 % of the annual Emax. This represents 13 weeks of no exchange.  
It should be repeated that each outage starts at the beginning of week 1.  
Figure 4.13 confirms that the power situation when outage occurs is highly critical. The mean 
socio-economic surplus of all years has a linear relation between length and reduced surplus. 
The linear relation indicates that on average, the time of outage is not important, but the 
length decides the consequences. For the worst year however, the relation is more 
logarithmical, indicating that the time of limitation is highly important. Outage in the two 
first weeks gives a steep reduction in socio-economic surplus. This is due to the great 
increase in prices at continental Europe as shown in Figure 4.12. The trend-line seems to flat 
out when outage in the worst year exceeds five weeks, and is close to parallel to the mean of 
all years from this outage length and further. This is because outage of Nord.Link does not 
affect prices on the continent as much as it did in the beginning of the year. 
The cost of an outage of Nord.Link for the system can be seen in the figure below. For 
instance, a three-week outage cost the society 5 MEUR in the worst year, and a mean cost of 
1.2 MEUR for all 75 climatic years.  
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Figure 4.13: Change in socio-economic surplus compared to the no-outage scenario. 
The simplified reason of why the socio-economic surplus reduces when prices increase is 
that consumer surplus reduces more than producer surplus increase. Taking the basic 
illustration of consumer and producer surplus (see Figure 2.1) into account, what is 
happening when prices increase is that the market cross moves. Due to the steeper demand 
curve, consumer surplus is then reducing more than producer surplus increase, and the net 
change in socio-economic surplus is negative.  
The consumers suffer when prices rise. Figure 4.14 presents the change in consumer surplus 
in Germany with respect to outage length. As seen in the figure, outage in the first week 
gives close to no consequence. Two weeks, however, gives a reduction in consumer surplus 
in Germany of 50 MEUR in the worst year. A five weeks outage increases the loss in 
consumer surplus by over 90 MEUR in the worst year, while it stays below 20 MEUR on 
average. 
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Figure 4.14: Change in consumer surplus in Germany compared to the no-outage scenario. 
Loss of 1.4 GW exchange capacity during power capacity shortage will cause severe 
consequences for consumers in Germany, while the consequences on system level (socio-
economic surplus) are small.    
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4.2.2 Energy-only market – median year 
The worst simulated year did experience some very high prices as presented in the previous 
section. The following analyses illustrate variations for the median year of the 75 climatic 
simulated years. The median year is the climatic year of 1981 and is supposed to illustrate a 
normal year.  
It should be repeated that the firm load in Germany follows a specific yearly pattern, i.e. do 
not vary between years. The pattern for the first five weeks is presented in Figure 4.1.  
Wind and solar production 
Figure 4.15 (1) shows wind production in Germany in the first five weeks for the worst and 
median year. Even in the median year, wind production fluctuates greatly, varying between 
2 and 43 GW. At some periods, the wind production is close to the same level as in the worst 
year.  
Figure 4.15 (2) shows the same presentation for solar power production. It is more 
production in the median year than the worst. However, the variations are still extensive, 
varying between 0 and 19 GW.  
When comparing power production patterns from both sources, the distinct randomness of 
energy supply is clear. The period with highest wind production (up to hour 100) has the 
lowest solar production. Around hour 150, both sources have low active capacity, providing 
about 5 GW in total. However, between hours 300-400, the production from both sources 
are high, reaching close to 60 GW. This is about 60 % of the peak load in Germany. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.15: (1) Wind- and (2) solar production in Germany. 
Exchange 
Figure 4.16 presents the exchange on Nord.Link for the median year. In the no-outage 
scenario, the exchange pattern fits well with the wind production in Germany. There is 
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maximum export from Norway when wind production is low, and opposite when the 
production is high.  
The net export from Norway is less in the median year compared to the worst year (see 
Figure 4.3), reduced from 1018.7 to 577.7 GWh for these five weeks.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.16: Exchange on Nord.Link the first five weeks in the median year with (1) no outage and (2) 
3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
In the median year, some exchange will be rerouted when outage of Nord.Link occurs. Figure 
4.17 shows the flow on NorNed and Skagerrak 1-4 without (1) and with outage (2) of 
Nord.Link. The energy export the first five weeks rises from 622.7 to 687.4 GWh, i.e. 
increased flow towards continental Europe. However, the loss of Nord.Link do not seem to 
be covered by increased power flow on other interconnections, as they are at its maximum 
in many hours already in the no-outage scenario.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.17: Exchange on NorNed and Skagerrak 1-4 the first five weeks in the median year with (1) 
no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
Figure 4.18 shows exchange from Netherlands to Great Britain. In high priced hours on the 
continent, the exchange capacity is at its maximum even in the no-outage scenario. The total 
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amount of exchange are close to unchanged when Nord.Link is out, only increasing the net 
power flow towards the continent by 10 GWh for these five weeks. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.18: Exchange on Netherlands-GB the first five weeks in the median year with (1) no outage 
and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
Flexible load  
Figure 4.19 shows the use of flexible load in Germany these five weeks for the median year. 
It confirms the very edge of power capacity shortage in some hours, even in a “normal year”. 
The spike in Germany at hour 250 and 420 rises by 1.4 GW when outage occurs - the exact 
capacity of Nord.Link. The spike at hour 520 would be expected to rice equally if the outage 
lasted that long (online from hour 504). Instead, it remains unchanged.  
At hour 250, both wind and solar production is very low, resulting in the highest peak of 
flexible load. The power production situation is the same between hours 600-700, but Figure 
4.2 (2) confirms that the firm load in this period is low, resulting in no need of flexible load. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.19: Flexible load in the median year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
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Even in the median year, a three-week outage of Nord.Link increases the use of flexible load 
noticeable. In critical hours, the prices are high in Germany and capacity on other links 
already used, limiting the possibility of rerouted power flow. The intermittence of wind- and 
solar production could challenge the system balance even in a normal year. It is clear that 
having available exchange capacity is important. 
Prices 
The German prices for the median year are volatile, as shown in Figure 4.20, but still far less 
than the worst year (see Figure 4.9). During the outage, a new spike exceeding 450 
EUR/MWh occurs around hour 410. The loss of 1.4 GW from Nord.Link, about 1.5 % of the 
consumption, rises the price quickly due to the need of more expensive flexible load. The 
amount is not that great, but in a situation with power capacity shortage, the consequences 
even in a normal year could be significant in some hours. Despite of the distinct rise in 
certain hours, the average price for the first five weeks rises by 2.4 EUR/MWh. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.20: Prices in Germany the first five weeks in the median year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 
weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
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4.2.3 Capacity remuneration mechanism – worst year 
If CRM is included, there is no longer an energy-only market. CRM leads to a higher amount 
of thermal capacity installed. In periods with high load combined with low wind and solar 
production, this extra installed capacity could prevent use of flexible load. More capacity 
available does also reduce the prices as the marginal cost of the system reduces (cheaper 
than flexible load). The aim of this section is to see how consequences change when there is 
increased installed capacity in the system. 
The CRM evaluated provides 18.5 GW extra thermal capacity in Germany, with an annualised 
investment and maintenance cost of 70 EUR/kW (considers discount rent). The extra cost for 
the system adds up to 1295 MEUR. This amount of extra capacity is not necessarily realistic; 
the importance is that the peak load is covered. There is interesting to see what influence 
such mechanism has regarding prices. The same approach as with Energy-Only Market 
(EOM) is used to see variations for the worst year.  
It should be mentioned that it was no new calibration of the model when including this extra 
capacity. A calibration affects the utilization of hydro reservoirs. However, it is expected that 
this gives no consequences in Germany, as the calibration mainly affects hydro areas. 
Prices 
Figure 4.21 compares a three-week outage of Nord.Link with EOM and CRM. With CRM, high 
price peaks are eliminated. However, the average price of all 75 climatic years only changes 
slightly, decreasing from 56.8 to 55.2 EUR/MWh with CRM.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.21: Price percentiles in Germany with 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link with (1) EOM and (2) 
CRM. 
Further analysis reveals that the average price in Germany over 75 climatic years does not 
change whether Nord.Link outage occurs or not with CRM. This is no surprise considering 
that the price on average only increased by 0.1 EUR/MWh with EOM (see Figure 4.8).  
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Figure 4.22 compares prices in Germany the first five weeks of the worst year for the two 
market solutions with outage of Nord.Link. CRM reduces the volatility as well as the average 
price in Germany compared to EOM. The average price in Germany with EOM reaches 96.3 
EUR/MWh, while it stays below 62 EUR/MWh with CRM. In addition, the standard deviation 
is reduced by a factor of 10.  
Further analysis reveals that there are no use of flexible load in Germany when CRM is 
included, explaining the avoidance of high peak prices.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.22: Prices in Germany the first five weeks with 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link in the worst 
year with (1) EOM and (2) CRM. 
Appendix B presents prices in Norway for both EOM and CRM in Germany, as well as 
exchange on Nord.Link. The results reveal that the volatility in both countries is lower with 
CRM in Germany, and that the export from Norway is reduced by almost 50 %. This is due to 
the lower prices in Germany.  
The results show that outage of Nord.Link gives no significant consequences in Germany 
with CRM - not even in the worst year. Power capacity shortage is avoided.   
Surplus of various stakeholders 
CRM require investment costs for the extra thermal capacity installed as well as 
maintenance cost. This additional cost must be taken into account when comparing socio-
economic surplus for different market solutions.  
The extra capacity of 18.5 GW caused by CRM is an assumption, equally to the investment 
and maintenance cost of 70 EUR/kW. To make the result more robust, a sensitivity analysis 
taking into account +/- 30 % estimate of the annualised cost is included. The estimated cost 
would then be in the range between 49 EUR/kW and 91 EUR/kW, giving a total cost of 
respectively 906.5 and 1683.5 MEUR.   
Figure 4.23 shows socio-economic surplus for EOM and CRM. The socio-economic surplus 
favourites EOM. CRM with its original additional cost (70 EUR/kW) reduces the mean socio-
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economic surplus by 1351 MEUR. The solution of CRM is expensive for the system as the 
socio-economic surplus drops. Even with the -30 % estimate of extra cost, socio-economic 
surplus for EOM is far greater.  
 
Figure 4.23: Socio-economic surplus comparing EOM to CRM with a +/- 30 % range of annualised 
cost. 
The socio-economic surplus is higher for EOM than CRM in all evaluated years. This is the 
case even without the additional investment and maintenance cost included. However, that 
seems not correct. More capacity installed would, as mentioned, reduce the system cost 
(when neglecting the additional investment and maintenance cost) as flexible load is more 
expensive. This should have led to lower price and higher socio-economic surplus. Since the 
model was not calibrated with CRM, this affects prices, and further surpluses. However, the 
consequences following calibration issue are expected to be small compared to the 
difference in surplus between the two market solutions. This means that these figures give 
the bigger picture when comparing EOM to CRM. 
The response in surplus for the median year are random. Due to the series simulation, 
outage in previous years affects the amount of water stored. This will further influence the 
water value and the amount of production in following years. The median year are included 
to see a possible response in a normal year, emphasizing variability. The median year is 
therefore too variable, and should not be representative to analyse expected surplus for a 
normal year. 
Figure 4.24 shows the same presentation as above for consumer surplus in Germany. All 
extra capacity is installed in Germany, which means that the additional cost is allocated to 
consumers there. Consumers indirectly pay the costs for extra capacity through their 
electricity bill.  
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From the figure, it is clear that consumers are most affected by CRM. The mean deviation in 
consumer surplus varies between 1745 MEUR and 527 MEUR in favour of EOM. CRM 
provides a higher electricity bill for consumers than in an energy-only market.   
 
Figure 4.24: Consumer surplus in Germany comparing EOM to CRM with a +/- 30 % range of 
annualised cost. 
Figure 4.25 shows the change in socio-economic surplus comparing a three-week outage to 
the no-outage scenario for both market solutions. Here, calibration issue is no problem as it 
is the change that is analysed.  
The effect of investing in more capacity is clear. With EOM, the consequences are volatile. 
For the worst year, the reduction in socio-economic surplus is over five times greater than 
with CRM. The extra installed capacity in Germany through CRM makes the entire system 
more robust, keeping prices steady resulting in small changes in socio-economic surplus.  
The counter intuitive rise in the median year for EOM can be explained by the higher 
reservoir filling in Norway when outage occur, allowing more production throughout the 
year. This increases the surplus, even though the price in Norway becomes somewhat lower 
during Nord.Link outage. 
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Figure 4.25: Change in socio-economic surplus for EOM and CRM for 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link 
referred to the no-outage scenario. 
The cost of outage for consumers in Germany is shown in Figure 4.26. The variations 
between each evaluated case is significant. Due to the steep demand (almost inelastic), a 
small change in price changes the consumer surplus significantly, explaining the vast 
numbers. 
For the worst year, the loss in consumer surplus exceeds 60 MEUR for an EOM. With CRM, 
the loss reaches only 4 MEUR. For the mean of all years, the loss in consumer surplus for 
CRM is almost negligible, while the loss exceeds 8 MEUR with EOM.  
 
Figure 4.26: Change in consumer surplus in Germany for EOM and CRM for 3 weeks outage of 
Nord.Link referred to the no-outage scenario. 
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It is evident that CRM is costly for consumers, but the inclusion of more capacity makes 
prices stable. A three-week outage in an energy-only market at worst time increases the 
yearly loss in consumer surplus by a factor of 15 compared to if extra capacity is installed.  
Transmission cable outage is expensive for consumers in continental Europe if it occurs 
during power capacity shortage. In a CRM-solution, stressed situations are avoided because 
there are enough spare capacity to prevent extensive use of flexible load, and the 
consequences of exchange outage are low. 
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4.3 Power production outage 
As statistical data presented in section 3.1.2 confirms, production units are also affected by 
forced outages. This section intend to reveal consequences of such events. The simulation 
uses outage of 1.4 GW thermal capacity in Germany. CRM is not analysed since Germany 
then has enough capacity installed to avoid high prices. Similar to transmission outage, the 
power plants are set to be unavailable annually from the beginning of the first week. The 
outage duration is set to be three weeks, which is in line with the ten-year fault statistics of 
fossil-fired units.  
Figure 4.27 shows power exchange on Nord.Link in the worst year. The change in power flow 
due to outage of thermal capacity is marginal. This means that the outage of power plants is 
not covered by increased power flow on Nord.Link. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.27: Exchange on Nord.Link referred to Norway the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) 
no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of 1.4 GW thermal power plants. 
Figure 4.28 shows flexible load activated in Germany in the worst year. The flexible load 
spikes increase when the thermal power plants are out of service. The import from Norway 
is at its maximum during all hours with use of flexible load – even before the outage.   
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Figure 4.28: Flexible load the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks 
outage of 1.4 GW thermal power plants. 
Figure 4.29 shows prices for the worst year in Germany. The lack of 1.4 GW thermal power 
production increases the prices noticeable. The average price increases by 7.4 EUR/MWh, 
and very high price peaks reach 900 EUR/MWh. The prices rise due to extensive use of 
flexible load. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.29: Prices in Germany the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 
weeks outage of 1.4 GW thermal power plants. 
Figure 4.30 shows change in consumer surplus in Germany with 3 weeks outage of 1.4 GW 
thermal power production. The mean of all 75 climatic years shows a reduction of 8.5 MEUR. 
The worst year, however, exceeds a loss in consumer surplus of 60 MEUR. The consequence 
of 1.4 GW less power production capacity is significant during power capacity shortage. 
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Figure 4.30: Change in consumer surplus in Germany with 3 weeks outage of 1.4 GW thermal power 
production. 
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4.4 Impact of including start-up cost for thermal power plants 
Including start-up cost for thermal power plants extends the simulation time significantly, 
and has been left out in all previous simulations. The purpose of this section is to consider 
the impact of including this extra cost. 
It should be mentioned that the model is not calibrated when including start-up cost. Such 
calibration takes several weeks. Calibration mostly affects the utilization of hydro reservoirs. 
In a system at size of Northern Europe, it is assumed that such calibration does not have a 
significant impact of the results. The calibration used without start-up cost included is 
therefore used also here. 
4.4.1 Allocated versus aggregated hydropower plants 
Including start-up cost in the simulation with allocated production are very time consuming, 
taking about 20 hours per simulated climatic year. All simulations including start-up costs are 
performed on aggregated level to solve the equations faster. Aggregated level means that all 
reservoirs and hydropower plants in each area are aggregated into one unit (see illustration 
in Figure 2.11).  
The comparison between “allocated level” and “aggregated level” is presented in Appendix 
C. The results show that there is no change in prices for thermal-based areas. However, the 
volatility reduces noticeable in hydro-based areas, and the average price reduces somewhat. 
Nevertheless, there is no difference in results on system level. This means that each 
comparison between allocated level and aggregated level including start-up cost is a direct 
comparison of the system with and without start-up cost.  
4.4.2 Simulations with and without start-up cost  
Figure 4.31 shows exchange on Nord.Link with and without start-up cost included in the 
simulation. It is clear that the exchange pattern is more varying when start-up cost is taken 
into account. The fluctuations are changing because thermal units now have to include start-
up cost in the production planning. The planners must evaluate whether to continue 
production during hours with lower price than their marginal cost just to be ready for the 
next hour with higher price, or to stop. When start-up cost is neglected, the unit can start 
and stop rapidly without financially issues.  
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Figure 4.31: Exchange on Nord.Link referred to Norway the first five weeks in the worst year for EOM 
(1) with start-up cost and (2) without. 
The net export from Norway for this period is reduced by approximately 20 % when start-up 
cost is included.  
The use of flexible load is also affected by this extra cost. Figure 4.32 (1) shows use of flexible 
load throughout the worst year with and without start-up cost included. There is an evident 
different. When start-up cost is included, use of flexible load appears throughout the whole 
year - not only in the first five weeks. This is explained by power producers reluctance to 
turn on power plants when high price only appear for some hours. Demand is met by use of 
flexible load instead of turning on extra production. 
An important observation is the size of the high peaks in the beginning of the year. They do 
not change whether start-up cost is included or not. This is hours with so high price that any 
power production is turned on anyway. The highest prices in simulations without start-up 
cost are then assumed to be equal to those simulations where start-up cost is considered.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.32: Flexible load in Germany over the worst year with 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link for EOM 
(1) with start-up cost and (2) without. 
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Figure 4.33 presents prices in Germany with and without start-up cost included. Start-up 
cost increases the volatility. Both higher prices as well as lower are seen throughout the 
year. Without start-up cost, the price pattern is more narrow. However, the average price of 
all 75 climatic years increases by only 1 EUR/MWh when including start-up cost.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.33: Price percentiles in Germany for EOM (1) with start-up cost and (2) without. 
The low prices occur because of thermal power plants reluctance to turn off during short 
low-price periods. When including start-up cost, this extra cost is also included to the 
variable cost (fuel cost) in order to decide when to produce. In some hours, the price is 
below the marginal cost of the thermal unit. The cost for stopping and starting up need to be 
higher than the deviation between marginal cost (fuel cost, efficiency) and price over the 
period in order to stop. If opposite, the unit will produce at its minimum capacity, typical 25 
% of rated, until the price exceeds the marginal cost again. The same evaluation is done in 
hours with lack of capacity. The units do not turn on if the start-up cost is higher than the 
deviation between marginal cost and price over the time. This explains the arrival of new 
peaks throughout the year in Figure 4.33 (1).  
Figure 4.34 shows prices in Germany for the first five weeks of the worst year. Including 
start-up cost reduces the average slightly as well as increasing the volatility. Some new price 
peaks occur due to the reluctance to turn on capacity for specific hours. However, the 
highest peaks do not change, and the impact of including start-up cost is low. 
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Figure 4.34: Prices in Germany in the worst year for EOM with 3 weeks outage of 1.4 GW thermal 
power production (1) with start-up cost and (2) without. 
The same figure as above for transmission cable outage is presented in Appendix D. 
Additionally, change in utilisation time and profit margin for fossil-fired units are shown. The 
conclusion is that all units earn more and run longer with start-up cost included. 
Figure 4.35 shows the change in consumer surplus in Germany for a three-week production 
outage with and without start-up cost included. The mean vary between a loss in consumer 
surplus of 8 and 8.5 MEUR, respectively with and without start-up cost. The worst year vary 
between 64 and 61 MEUR.  Overall, the impact of including start-up cost is small. 
 
Figure 4.35: Change in consumer surplus for production outage in EOM with and without start-up 
cost. 
The results from this section verify that German consumers suffer when capacity outage 
occurs – no matter if start-up cost is included. Including start-up cost gives more volatile 
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prices. Nevertheless, the highest peaks and the change in consumer surplus are close to 
unchanged.  
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4.5 Prices in Norway in 2010 and 2030 
The intension of this section is to show how the prices in Norway are expected to change 
between 2010 and 2030. In this period, the number of cables between Norway and North 
Europe will be increased by four, providing increased exchange capacity of 4.2 GW. These 
results are further used in the discussion part to evaluate the security of supply from Norway 
to continental Europe. 
Figure 4.36 shows price percentiles in Norway for 2010 and 2030. It is seen that the average 
price increases by 2 EUR/MWh. The average price is slightly higher in 2030 because Norway 
is connected to the continent by more cables. However, the price peak is significantly higher 
in 2010 than 2030, exceeding 130 EUR/MWh at the worst time. The price peak in 2030 is 
reduced by 50 EUR/MWh compared to 2010.  
The water inflow to the reservoirs has a great impact on the power price in areas dominated 
by hydropower. The high prices in Norway for 2010 are caused by lack of exchange capacity 
in the driest years. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 4.36: Price percentiles in Norway for EOM in (1) 2010 and (2) 2030. 
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5. Discussion 
This chapter is divided into three main parts:  
 Discussions of main results 
 Benefits of market participation for cross-border capacity 
 Validity of results 
Discussion of main results section collects the main findings in the report and draws 
conclusions. The aim is to compare and discuss these results in order to evaluate the 
consequence of forced outages from a market perspective.   
Benefits of market participation for cross-border capacity section evaluates participation of 
foreign capacity into CRM and considers possible system solutions.  
Validity of results section comments on simplifications and assumptions made in the thesis, 
emphasizing the effects on the presented results. 
5.1 Discussions of main results 
This section collects and compares the main results from simulations done in this master 
thesis.  
5.1.1 Transmission cable outage is expensive for consumers in 
continental Europe if it occurs during power capacity shortage 
Figure 5.1 shows power flow on NorNed and Skagerrak 1-4 (1) without and (2) with outage 
of Nord.Link. There are close to no change in power flow. Due to the relatively strong grid 
interconnection on the continent, prices in North-West European countries are high at the 
same time. In such situations, when capacity is highly needed, it cannot be expected that 
outage of one link can be compensated by increased power flow in others. The direct 
consequence of outage on Nord.Link during power capacity shortage is 1.4 GW less power 
supply to Germany. 
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Figure 5.1: Exchange on NorNed and Skagerrak 1-4 referred to Norway the first five weeks in the 
worst year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
The results show that a three-week outage of 1.4 GW exchange capacity has close to no 
impact on the average price in Germany for all 75 climatic years. However, in the worst year, 
which is the originally highest priced year in Germany, the price increases significantly. Lack 
of power production requires use of expensive flexible load, resulting in high price spikes. 
During these circumstances outage of exchange capacity has a significant impact on the 
power price.  
Figure 5.2 shows prices in Germany the first five weeks of the worst year. The highest price 
peak in Germany is 700 EUR/MWh when Nord.Link is available. This is a period with close to 
no wind and solar production, and demand is met by extensive use of flexible load. However, 
the highest price peak rises further by 200 EUR/MWh during outage of Nord.Link, increasing 
the average price by 7.7 EUR/MWh. The rise in prices makes it more expensive to consume 
electricity, affecting consumer surplus in Germany greatly. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 5.2: Prices in Germany the first five weeks in the worst year with (1) no outage and (2) 3 weeks 
outage of Nord.Link. 
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Outage of 1.4 GW exchange capacity in a system at 100 GW as Germany, is not much. 
Despite of that, a three-week outage of Nord.Link might increase the average price in 
Germany by 2.4 EUR/MWh for the first five weeks in a normal year.  
Norway is also affected by the outage of Nord.Link, but far less than Germany. The highest 
price peak for all 75 climatic years due to a three-week outage reaches 122 EUR/MWh, while 
the average price reduces by 0.1 EUR/MWh. The new price peaks occur after the outage 
period and is caused by the lower reservoir level in the first three weeks due to less 
exchange possibilities. However, the worst year in Germany is a year with normal prices in 
Norway.  
It is evident that transmission cable outage might cause a significant impact on power prices 
on the continent. The consequence of outage depends greatly on the initial power situation 
when outage occurs, and not necessarily the outage length. This is also the case for the 
worst year as seen in Figure 5.2. Some price spikes increase by 200 EUR/MWh during outage 
of Nord.Link. Others do not rise at all.  
Loss of 1.4 GW exchange capacity during power capacity shortage will cause severe 
consequences for consumers in Germany, while the consequences on system level are small. 
For comparison, a three-week outage of Nord.Link costs consumers in Germany 60 MEUR, 
while the loss in socio-economic surplus is only 5 MEUR.  
Figure 5.3 shows change in consumer surplus versus outage length. The trend-line for the 
worst year is very steep up to three weeks outage of Nord.Link. Then, it slowly becomes 
parallel to the trend-line of the mean of all 75 climatic years. This is because outage of 
Nord.Link does not affect prices in Germany as much as it did in the beginning of the year.  
 
Figure 5.3: Change in consumer surplus in Germany compared to the no-outage scenario. 
The loss of not providing back-up power exchange is evident. A two-week outage of 
Nord.Link costs German consumers close to 50 MEUR if it occurs during power capacity 
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shortage. Nevertheless, the mean loss in consumer surplus of all 75 climatic years for a 
fifteen-week outage does not exceed 30 MEUR. The sensitivity analysis presented in the 
figure above reveals that transmission cable outages might provide a significantly higher 
electricity bill for consumers if it occurs when exchange capacity is needed.  
The loss in consumer surplus presented in Figure 5.3 is evaluated to be rather optimistic. If 
the flexible load simulated was closer to the real system, each step should have been larger 
in power load (MW). This means that more load would have been disconnected, and prices 
increased further. In addition, consumers react to changing prices in the model. This is not 
necessarily realistic, especially not for short term changes in supply, because consumers do 
not really see the price changes.  
Due to the domino-effect on the continent caused by the great interconnected grid, the loss 
in consumer surplus in Germany is only a part of the total loss in consumer surplus. The 
outage of Nord-Link rises prices in several countries on the continent, as presented in Figure 
5.4. The value of providing back-up power exchange capacity to continental Europe is high 
because available transmission capacity leads to lower power prices for consumers.  
 
 
(1) 
 
 
(2) 
Figure 5.4: Area prices the first five weeks in Northern Europe in the worst year with (1) no outage 
and (2) 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link. 
However, the consequence of transmission outages depends greatly on the market solution 
in Germany. Capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM) ensures that there is enough installed 
capacity to cover peak load. CRM makes the system robust, avoiding power capacity 
shortage and very high prices. 
The analysis shows situations with a high stable electricity bill (CRM) or electricity bill with 
great variations (EOM). CRM will almost eliminate all peaks in Germany, providing stable 
prices, but may give high losses in consumer surplus. The losses are caused by extra 
investment and maintenance cost for new power plants. These costs are indirectly paid by 
consumers as part pf the electricity price. Despite of that, power price response from an 
outage of Nord.Link has low impact in a market solution with CRM. The loss in consumer 
surplus for a three-week outage goes from exceeding 60 MEUR in EOM, to 4 MEUR in CRM, 
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as shown in Figure 5.5. This is because there will be enough spare capacity installed in the 
system to avoid use of expensive flexible load in a CRM-solution.  
The question is then how much consumers are willing to pay over time to avoid short-term 
variations. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Change in consumer surplus in Germany for EOM and CRM for 3 weeks outage of 
Nord.Link referred to the no-outage scenario. 
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5.1.2 Production outage gives identical consequences as transmission 
cable outage 
Figure 5.6 shows prices in Germany for the worst year, comparing outage of production and 
outage of transmission cable. The results give close to no difference in price pattern, i.e. the 
power capacity source is indifferent. This is expected. All available capacity is active as the 
marginal costs of any power production plant are far beneath the price peaks in such high 
price periods.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 5.6: Prices in Germany in the worst year for EOM with 3 weeks outage of 1.4 GW (1) thermal 
power production- and (2) transmission capacity. 
Figure 5.7 shows prices in Germany for the worst year with start-up cost included, presented 
equally as the figure above. Including start-up cost in the simulations is very time consuming. 
This should be included in thermal-dominated areas to emphasize their extra cost of 
start/stop. Despite of this, the results that include start-up cost give approximately the same 
loss in consumer surplus in Germany as when it is left out.  
Including start-up cost affects prices as they become more volatile. Both higher and lower 
prices are seen throughout the year caused by producers reluctance to turn on/off due to 
this extra start-up cost. However, in critical hours, all capacity is used due to the very high 
prices, and consequences are seen to be equal to when the start-up cost is left out. The 
previous presented results are valid, even though start-up cost is left out of the simulations.  
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(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 5.7: Prices in Germany in the worst year for EOM with start-up cost included with 3 weeks 
outage of 1.4 GW (1) thermal power production- and (2) transmission capacity (to be found in 
Appendix D). 
Figure 5.8 shows changes in consumer surplus in Germany when comparing power 
production and transmission cable outage. The difference in mean of all 75 climatic years 
varies with 0.5 MEUR, and the loss in consumer surplus for both cases exceeds 60 MEUR in 
the worst year. The consequence for consumers is negligible whether the capacity outage is 
production or transmission cable.  
 
Figure 5.8: Change in consumer surplus in Germany for 3 weeks outage of production- and 
transmission capacity. 
These discoveries confirm that the power capacity source is not important. The importance 
for German consumers is that capacity is available.  
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5.2 Benefits of market participation for cross-border capacity 
This section intends to justify foreign participation in capacity remuneration mechanism 
(CRM). It focuses on the benefits of including hydro-dominated areas like Norway in such 
mechanism. The main hypotheses to be discussed follow below:  
 HVDC-cables have less forced outages than fossil-fired units 
 Prices are not influenced by the unavailable capacity type 
 Norway becomes a more secure source of supply 
 CRM may reduce profit for cable owners 
5.2.1 HVDC-cables have less forced outages than fossil-fired units 
The basic statistical data for this discussion is presented in section 3.1.  
On average, unavailability stood for 12.1 % of the potential exchange on HVDC-cables for the 
period 2012-2013. Except disturbance outages, cable limitations and maintenance usually 
have a significant share of this category. Limitations are often a result of maintenance in the 
interconnected AC-grid. The two sub-categories of unavailability have in common that they 
are both usually predictable and can be carried out at suited time. They are therefore not 
assumed to be critical in respect to have capacity available in predefined, critical periods.  
Energy not transferred on HVDC-cables due to disturbance outages, was 4.7 % on average in 
the period 2012-2013. The ten-year average of unavailability due to unplanned non-
postponable events was 6.2 % for fossil-fired power plants. The statistical data on forced 
outages is in favour of HVDC-cables. 
Since the categories are not entirely harmonised, and the evaluated periods are not 
identical, it could be difficult to draw a conclusion. Despite of that, the categories seem to 
complement each other as they both cover forced outages.  
5.2.2 Prices are not influenced by the unavailable capacity type 
The results shown in section 5.1.2 reveal that the consequences of outage are equal whether 
there is transmission cable outage or power production outage. This means that the capacity 
source is not important with respect to change in prices. All available capacity is producing 
its rated power during stressed situations.  
5.2.3 Norway becomes a more secure source of supply 
High prices are a result of power production shortage. The Norwegian power production is 
dominated by hydropower. The inflow of water to the reservoirs is therefore critical in 
respect to power prices in Norway.  
The impact of variations in water inflow on prices in Norway will be reduced with increased 
exchange capacity. In dry years, i.e. low inflow of water to reservoirs, Norway can import 
energy in order to store water. In 2010, the total HVDC exchange capacity from Norway was 
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1.6 GW. It is expected that the HVDC exchange capacity from Norway will rise by 4.2 GW 
until 2030 compared to 2010 levels: 0.7 GW to Netherland (NorNed II), 1.4 GW to Germany 
(Nord.Link), 1.4 GW to Great Britain (NSN) and 0.7 GW to Denmark (Skagerrak 4).  
Figure 5.9 shows Norwegian price percentiles for a power system in 2010 and the expected 
system configuration in 2030. In 2030, the price peaks are significantly reduced due to 
increased exchange capacity. The highest Norwegian price peak in 2030 is reduced by 50 
EUR/MWh compared to 2010. Even in the worst year in Germany, prices in Norway will be 
normal. The consequences of dry years will be less in the future. This makes Norway a more 
reliable source of supply with respect to energy in critical periods.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure 5.9: Price percentiles in Norway in (1) 2010 and (2) 2030. 
5.2.4 CRM may reduce profit for cable owners 
Norway utilizes its production flexibility; importing energy when prices on the other side of 
the cable are low, and vice versa. However, inclusion of CRM in foreign countries reduces 
the price volatility and may reduce cable utilization. This further reduces the profit for cable 
owners. Cable participation in CRM is a measure to increase the profit again. Cable owners 
are then paid for installed capacity as well as energy sold. Exclusion of cables from CRM will 
likely bring up questions regarding closing borders in order to protect flexibility. Incentives 
for investing in new cables will also be reduced.  
Moreover, the participation of cross-border capacity could provide investment incentives for 
new exchange capacity as well as reinvestments in Norwegian hydropower plants. 
5.2.5 Participation in and implementation of cross-border CRM capacity  
Current policy has two main targets: cleaner energy sector and secure power supply. Great 
amounts of renewables are, and will be, implemented on the continent. However, 
renewables need sufficient back-up power generation due to its intermittence.  
CRM is a technology neutral solution to ensure system adequacy. Technology neutral means 
that also fossil-fired units are included. CRM is criticized due to giving subsidies to polluting 
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fossil-fired power plants, which is counter intuitive to current policy. Cross-border capacity 
does the same job as internal production in respect to system adequacy, and it is cleaner (if 
supplied by hydropower). Cross-border capacity does therefore fulfil both policy targets: It is 
cleaner and ensures security of supply. Additionally, cross-border capacity is sufficient even 
considering unavailability due to forced outages. On top of that, it will reduce the required 
domestic installed generation capacity.  
All previous arguments points out that cross-border capacity should be included if capacity 
remuneration mechanism is implemented in foreign countries.  
However, there are some differences between the capacity providers. The main difference 
between production capacity and cross-border capacity is that producers need to supply the 
cross-border capacity with power. This demands some predefined regulations between the 
system operator and producers.  
During stressed operations on both sides of the link, both sides should be equally prioritized. 
There should be an agreement between producers supplying a cable and the cable owner in 
order to provide the contractual obligation at all conditions. The participation should benefit 
foreign producers as well as cable owners financially. If the generator is unavailable, or the 
cable owner does not fulfil its obligation of available capacity, there should be penalties. 
However, the penalty must not frighten participation of CRM, but still intensify necessary 
maintenance and upgrades for the owner to keep the link available in vulnerable periods. 
Splitting the payment of CRM between adequacy and firmness could be a solution. 
Adequacy aims to ensure that capacity is installed, while firmness aims to ensure enough 
available capacity, also in the worst periods. Some is paid when the capacity is installed to 
ensure adequacy. If parts of the payment of participation are connected to deliveries during 
critical, predefined periods, firmness could also be considered.  
Cross-border capacity included in CRM is also in line with EUs target of a clean European 
power system, as well as a strong and interconnected power system to provide security of 
supply. If foreign participation is excluded, incentives of interconnection and reaching 
internal energy market will be difficult.  
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5.3 Validity of results 
In all kind of simulations, it is important to be critical to the results as they do not necessarily fulfil 
every perspective of the issue. There are some important items that should be addressed. This 
section evaluates these shortly, giving assumptions of their impact on the presented results.   
  
Areas outside Northern Europe are modelled with fixed exchange based on historical data with 
hourly resolution. These boundary conditions are set to reduce the calculation time. It is assumed 
that if the exchange was not fixed, more capacity could have been available during stressed 
situations. This would reduce the size of super peak prices.  
 
Demand reacts immediately to price changes. This is an important issue, and is not realistic. 
Consumers do not see the price signals - especially regular consumers that are charged by monthly 
resolution. In periods with tight capacity, prices would increase and consequences would be higher.  
 
Calibration issues appear in simulations with CRM and start-up cost. A calibration would 
utilize water resources even better. Therefore, a calibration is beneficial, improving the 
results. However, calibration of a model of this size takes several weeks. 
Start-up cost are not included throughout the results, but compared at the end. The conclusion is 
that start-up cost increases the price volatility, as well as variations in exchange. However, at the 
most critical hours, the inclusion of start-up cost is not important. All available power production 
sources supply their rated power because of the high power price. Therefore, start-up cost has no 
impact on the super peak prices. The average price is also close to unchanged, as well as variations in 
surpluses.  
 
Very high numbers in surpluses could question the accuracy of the model. For instance, the 
consumer surplus in Germany with EOM exceeded 171 500 MEUR. The worst change in surplus of a 
three-week outage was about 60 MEUR. This change in surplus is only 0.3 thousandth. However, the 
results seem logical and consistent.  
 
Consumption in Germany has a yearly constant pattern in all the 75 climatic simulated years. This is 
not necessarily realistic. However, the real load variations are not expected to vary as much as for 
instance in Norway. This is because space heat takes up a significant share of the electricity 
consumption in Norway, and the amount depends greatly on winter temperature. 
 
Constant fossil fuel price from today to 2030 is an assumption. It is assumed that the CO2-price 
increases until 2030, making the total cost of producing energy from fossil-fired units higher. 
Additionally, change in fuel cost would affect the production. Variability in fuel cost could lead to 
greater price volatilities, which again would affect consequences of outages. 
 
AC limitations are included, but only by a constant reduction factor of 0.7 reducing the transmission 
capacity. EMPS is a transport model, with no underlying power flow. A power flow tool would make 
the flow more realistic, but much more time consuming.  
 
HVDC-cable and production statistics are not entirely harmonised. This means that the 
statistical database might use categories differently. This is an issue when comparing 
statistical data from different distributors. Despite of that, the categories seem to 
complement each other as they both cover forced outages. 
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6. Conclusion 
This study highlights the impact of HVDC-cable exchange outages between the Nordic area 
and the European continent, in order to evaluate the value of providing back-up generation 
capacity from Norway to the continent. 
The main findings are:  
 Transmission cable outage is expensive for consumers in continental Europe if it 
occurs during power capacity shortage. Consequences of outage are not determined 
by the outage length, but the initial power situation and the market solution in the 
affected area. 
 Outage of one link will not be covered by increased power flow in other 
interconnections during power capacity shortage. This is because these transmission 
cables already are fully exploited due to price differences during such circumstances. 
 Cross-border capacity should be included in foreign Capacity Remuneration 
Mechanism (CRM) because transmission cable outage gives identical consequences 
as power production capacity outage at the continent. Additionally, Norway becomes 
a more secure source of supply in the future due to more interconnections, making it 
possible to import energy in dry years.  
The results show that a three-week outage of 1.4 GW exchange capacity, has close to no 
impact on the average price in Germany for all 75 climatic years in an energy-only market. 
However, in the highest priced year, the price increases significantly. In this study, results 
have shown the highest price reaches 900 EUR/MWh in Germany during a three-week 
outage of Nord.Link. This is 200 EUR/MWh higher than if Nord.Link had been available. 
These price peaks are a result of extensive use of flexible load. Norway is also affected by the 
outage of Nord.Link, but far less than Germany. The highest price peak for all 75 climatic 
years reaches 122 EUR/MWh, while the average price reduces by 0.1 EUR/MWh. 
Loss of 1.4 GW exchange capacity during power capacity shortage will cause severe 
consequences for consumers in Germany. Despite of that, the consequences on system level 
are small. For comparison, a three-week outage of Nord.Link costs consumers in Germany 60 
MEUR, while the loss in socio-economic surplus is only 5 MEUR. 
Simulations show that the outage length has low impact regarding power prices and 
consequences for consumer surplus in Germany. However, initial power situation when 
outage occurs is important. A two-week outage of Nord.Link costs German consumers close 
to 50 MEUR if it occurs during power capacity shortage. Nevertheless, the mean loss in 
consumer surplus of all 75 climatic years for a fifteen-week outage does not exceed 30 
MEUR. The sensitivity analysis reveals that transmission cable outage will provide a 
significantly higher electricity bill for consumers in Germany if it occurs when exchange 
capacity is needed.  
The amount of installed conventional power has a great impact on consumer consequences. 
Extra installed capacity could be ensured through additional payment to producers and 
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flexible consumers through Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM). If there is enough 
capacity installed to avoid price spikes, the highest loss in consumer surplus in Germany 
caused by a three-week outage of Nord.Link is only 4 MEUR. This is a loss reduction of 93 % 
compared to 60 MEUR in an energy-only market.  
Outage of one link will not be covered by increased power flow in other interconnections 
during power capacity shortage. Exchange capacity in other links is fully used during stressed 
situations due to the price differences - even before outage of Nord.Link. The direct 
consequence of outage during such circumstances is 1.4 GW less power supply capacity to 
Germany. 
The impact of variations in water inflow on prices in Norway will be reduced with increased 
exchange capacity. In future dry years, Norway can import energy in order to store water 
and the consequences of dry years will be less severe. The simulations show that the highest 
Norwegian price peak in 2030 will then be reduced by 50 EUR/MWh compared to 2010. This 
makes Norway a more reliable source of supply with respect to energy in critical periods.  
From the case study, it is concluded that transmission cable outage gives identical 
consequences in price as power production outage in Germany. Additionally, the fault-
statistics are in favour of transmission cables, and foreign participation in CRM should 
therefore be recommended. Cross-border capacity included in CRM is also in line with EUs 
target of a clean European power system, as well as a strong and interconnected power 
system to provide security of supply.  
Furthermore, the value of providing back-up generation from Norway to continental Europe 
is high because the exchange capacity will reduce continental power prices significantly 
during power capacity shortage. 
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7. Future works 
Here are some proposals for further works: 
 The model should be calibrated, both for CRM and start-up cost, in order to make the 
results more valid.  
 Harmonised statistical data is wanted. This would improve the quality of comparing 
production and HVDC-cable fault-statistics.  
 A sensitivity analysis of Norwegian prices and consumer surplus versus outage length 
is interesting. Some price peaks did occur due to a three-week outage of Nord.Link. 
How long outage of exchange capacity is acceptable before prices gets very high in 
Norway as well.  
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8. Nomenclature 
Abbreviations 
CRM – Capacity Remuneration Mechanism 
EMPS - EFIs Multi-area Power-market Simulator  
ENTSO-E – the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
EOM – Energy Only Market 
EURELECTRIC – The Union of the Electricity Industry  
HVAC – High Voltage Alternating Current 
HVDC – High Voltage Direct Current 
IEM – Internal Energy Market 
NGC – Net Generation Capacity 
RES – Renewable Energy Sources (assumed unregulated) 
TSO – Transmission System Operator (Example: Statnett SF in Norway) 
 
 
Definitions 
Firm load – Fixed load, following a yearly pattern. 
Flexible production – Technical flexible regarding controlling production both ways relatively 
quickly, i.e. increasing as well as decreasing power production. RES are by this definition not 
flexible. 
Hydropower – Electricity generated by controllable hydro units. 
Marginal cost – Refers to the actual power production cost of producing one extra unit of 
energy, and not the actual investment cost of the plant.  
Power capacity shortage – Lack of energy production, which often results in high prices due 
to the need of expensive flexible load to meet demand. 
Solar energy - Electricity generated by solar power plants. 
Stressed operation/situations – refers to power capacity shortage. See definition above. 
72 
 
Thermal-based area – Areas dominated by fossil-fired units, in combination with large 
amounts of wind and solar. “Thermal-based area” resembles the production configuration in 
Germany. 
Wind energy – Electricity generated by wind turbine units. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – EOM worst year 
This section shows power flow from Denmark and Sweden to Germany in the worst year in 
an energy-only market. There are close to no visible changes in exchange when outage 
occurs on Nord.Link, because their capacity is already exploited in hours with power capacity 
shortage on the continent.  
Denmark West – Germany:   
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.1: Exchange on Denmark west-Germany the first five weeks in the highest priced year in 
Germany with (1) no outage and (2) Nord.Link outage in the first 3 weeks of the year.  
Kontek (Denmark East - Germany):   
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.2: Exchange on Kontek the first five weeks in the highest priced year in Germany with (1) no 
outage and (2) Nord.Link outage in the first 3 weeks of the year.  
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Baltic cable (Sweeden - Germany): 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.3: Exchange on Baltic cable the first five weeks in the highest priced year in Germany with 
(1) no outage and (2) Nord.Link outage in the first 3 weeks of the year.  
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Appendix B – CRM worst year 
This section shows prices in Norway and exchange on Nord.Link for a CRM-solution in 
Germany. 
As seen in Figure A.4, the calibration in hydro production is not done (higher average price), 
i.e. do not utilize the reservoir fully. However, the average price is low compared to 
Germany.  
The price in Norway is slightly less volatile with CRM than EOM in Germany. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.4: Prices in Norway the first five weeks with 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link in the worst year 
with (1) EOM and (2) CRM  
Figure A.5 compares the no-outage exchange on Nord.Link for the two market solutions. The 
amount of exported energy from Norway is reduced with CRM. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.5: Exchange on Nord.Link referred to Norway the first five weeks with no outage in the 
worst year with (1) EOM and (2) CRM 
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Appendix C – Allocated versus aggregated simulation 
The differences between allocated and aggregated simulation are small, especially on the 
continent, which the following figures confirm. Allocation to specific plants are just done in 
hydro areas – never in thermal. This explains why the consequences are not visible in 
Germany. The impact of exchange is very low. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.6: Prices in Germany with EOM (1) allocated and (2) aggregated 
The worst year are also unchanged, as seen in Figure A.7. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.7: Prices in Germany for the worst year with (1) EOM (allocated) and (2) EOM (aggregated) 
However, prices in Norway are changing somewhat, shown in Figure A.8. The volatility seem 
to disappear when aggregating the areas, even though both have sequential resolution. The 
average price reduces from 46.8 to 46.4 EUR/MWh for over the 75 climatic years simulated. 
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(2) 
Figure A.8: Prices in Norway with EOM for simulation with (1) allocated and (2) aggregated hydro 
production 
The change in volatility is significant for the worst year. However, the average price reduces 
just by 0.5 EUR/MWh.  
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.9: Prices in Norway for the worst year with EOM for simulation with (1) allocated and (2) 
aggregated hydro production 
Exchange on Nord.Link are not affected by the use of aggregated simulation. 
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(2) 
Figure A.10: Exchange on Nord.Link referred to Norway the first five weeks with EOM for simulation 
with (1) allocated and (2) aggregated hydro production  
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Appendix D – Simulation with and without start-up cost 
Figure A.11 shows prices in Germany for the first five weeks of the worst year with a three-
week outage of Nord.Link. There are close to no impact of including start-up cost in the 
simulation in such high-price periods. 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Figure A.11:  Prices in Germany in the worst year for EOM with 3 weeks outage of Nord.Link (1) with 
start-up cost and (2) without. 
Table A.1 shows average profit for fossil-fired production sources with and without start-up 
cost included. When including start-up cost, the profit increases for all fossil-fired units, with 
an average about 10 EUR/MWh of all simulated years.  
 
Table A.1: Average profit (1) with start-up cost and (2) without 
 
 
(1) 
 
  
 
(2) 
Figure A.12 and Figure A.13 shows the annual margin and running hours for fossil-fired 
production sources, with and without start-up cost included. All units earn more and run 
longer with start-up cost included. 
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Figure A.12: Annual margin and utilization time with start-up cost for EOM 
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Figure A.13: Annual margin and utilization time without start-up cost for EOM 
 
